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The right moment for reforms
was missed 
President Yushchenko’s team failed to
launch transformations while the window
of opportunity was wide open. High public
confidence and economic growth at the
beginning of 2005 offered a good
foundation for instituting reforms. The new
Administration appeared unable to resolve
personal clashes within the Government
team, to introduce new democratic
policymaking approaches, or to react
appropriately to criticisms in an
uncensored media. The achievements of
the Tymoshenko Government include:
improved the living standards for the
poorest Ukrainians, macro'financial
stability and steps to combat corruption.
However, these achievements are not
sustainable because there are no long'term
development plans. Growing social outlays
in the context of an unreformed social
security system reek of populism, macro'
financial stability was supported through
inertia, and the war on corruption was
compromised by high'profile mudslinging
within the Government team itself.
The dismissal of the Tymoshenko
Government is unlikely to spoil the
achievements of the Orange Revolution. The
split in the Yushchenko team has effectively
raised standards for politicians and top
government officials. The ex'premier’s
intention to run for the 2006 Verkhovna
Rada elections independently will increase
political competition and encourage public
oversight of government decisions. ICPS
analysts say that having Ms. Tymoshenko in
the opposition could improve the quality of
state policies, provided the political battle
concentrates on better ideas and not on re'
distributing assets.
Unlike the Tymoshenko Government, the
next Cabinet will be less inclined to
populist policies. For one thing, the actions
of the new Government will not be
influenced by the political ambitions of its
members. However, this Government will
also not launch serious transformations for
four reasons:
• Too short an effective term. Constitutional
amendments come into force on 
1 January 2006 that allow the
Government to be formed by the
Verkhovna Rada. After the March
elections, the Government will most likely
be replaced.
• Lack of workable institutional procedures.
Like previous Governments, the new one
faces the lack of capacity among
government institutions to develop
policies in an environment that
recognizes competing interests.
• Weak support in the Verkhovna Rada. The
decline in public trust in the
Administration led to the gradual
collapse of the working majority in the
VR that had supported the decisions of
the Government and president.
• A worsening economic situation. Slower
economic growth increases the likelihood
that the government will tackle current
problems at the expense of long'term and
strategic goals.
Economic growth has slowed 
way down
According to preliminary data, real GDP
grew only 2.8% over January–August 2005.
The main factors behind this economic
slowdown are: a decline in investment and
a worsening in the foreign economic
situation. According to ICPS, this shrinking
investment is the result of four factors:
• growing political risks in late 2004–early
2005 made investors postpone
investment launches;
• public investment shrank because of
growing social spending in the Budget;
• growing tax revenues led to a decrease 
in working capital;
• lack of a clear Government position on
the criteria for revisiting privatization
tenders caused the owners of many
privatized companies to delay investment
decisions.
The deteriorating external situation
resulted in a significant slowdown in
Ukrainian industry and a decline in trade. A
drop in global metal prices led to shrinking
physical export volumes of metals and
metal products and, correspondingly,
reduced demand for coking coal and iron
ore. The decline in trade is due to shrinking
wholesale trade in metal products and oil.
Over January–August 2005, consumer prices
grew 6.7% compared to December 2004.
The dismissal of the Tymoshenko Government is unlikely spoil the achievements 
of the Orange Revolution. Growing political competition will foster better quality
policy making. ICPS economists have downgraded their forecast for the country’s
economic growth for 2005 to 4% because of shrinking investment and declining
global prices for Ukrainian export commodities. Greater predictability in state
policies after the Verkhovna Rada elections should spur investment in 2006–2007
ICPS downgrades its economic forecast
for 2005–2007
Find out more!
In the latest issue of quarterly
predictions you can read all about the
forecast for Ukraine’s economic
development, as well as:
• ICPS predictions for the political
situation;
• Factors in the way of reform;
• Plans to reform the law enforcement
system;
• The pros and cons of the 2006 Draft
Budget;
• Why the consumer basket does not
reflect real change in consumer prices;
• The ICPS forecast for changes in the
hryvnia exchange rate;
• The progress of Ukraine’s accession to
the World Trade Organization;
• How effective has the “Stop Smuggling”
program been;
• The shrinking foreign trade surplus;
• How to avoid a new “sugar crunch;”
• Problems with determining just how
undervalued China’s currency is.
You can subscribe quarterly predictions 
on/line at http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/
publications/subscribe/.
There was no seasonal deflation because
the price of sugar took off in June and July
2005. Inflation continues to run high due
to the rapid growth of personal incomes
and high inflationary expectations among
Ukrainian consumers. However, producer
prices will grow at a substantially slower
pace because of a drop in prices for
Ukrainian products on foreign markets and
because of slower economic growth.
The National Bank of Ukraine will resort to
a tighter monetary policy and try to curb
inflation by reducing emissions. Despite a
goods trade deficit over March–June 2005,
the supply of foreign currency continues to
outstrip demand on the interbank currency
exchange market. However, the NBU
reserves are growing more slowly than in
Spring 2005, when the Bank allowed the
appreciation of the hryvnia.
Forecast for 2005–2007
ICPS economists have downgraded their
forecast for GDP growth for 2005 by 3 pp to
4% due to a worsening in the forecast for
investment and a greater'than'anticipated
drop in prices for Ukrainian exports in
H1’05. ICPS also underestimated the
impact and duration of uncertainty in
relations between the “Orange”
Administration and business: the
government failed to meet the
expectations of businesses regarding
reduced state intervention in commercial
activity, the establishment of a level and
fair playing field, reduced corruption, and
the inviolability of property rights. ICPS
economists expect the country’s economy
to steam ahead in Q4’04, as the external
situation stabilizes.
Over 2006 and 2007, GDP growth will
accelerate to 5.5% and 6%, given a more
rapid growth of investment. Gross fixed
capital investment will grow 7% in 2006
and 9% in 2007. ICPS economists expect
investment to grow due to greater
predictability in state policies after the
Verkhovna Rada elections and a gradual
rise in public investment. According to
ICPS, the period between the 2006
Verkhovna Rada elections and the 2009
presidential election will be long enough
for the Yushchenko Administration to plan
and implement large'scale, long'term
objectives, instead of aiming all efforts at
achieving short'term results to win
elections. Over 2006–2007, new standards
of political competition will help improve
the quality of policymaking.
The ICPS forecast is for consumer price
inflation to reach 13.5% in 2005. Given
slower producer price growth and growing
wage arrears, ICPS economists have
downgraded their forecast. With household
incomes growing steeply, anti'inflationary
steps on the part of the Government will
yield little. Over 2006–2007, consumer
prices will grow at more slowly pace due to
slower growth in household incomes and
rising imports. According to ICPS
economists, rates for residential services
and passenger transport will go up after
the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections.
Producer price inflation will slow down
during the forecast period.
According to ICPS, the NBU will support a
stable UAH/USD exchange rate until late
2005. The ICPS forecast is that the NBU
will not resort to targeting inflation after
the Rada elections. Over 2005–2007,
interest rates for hryvnia loans at
commercial banks will slip to 9% per
annum, while hryvnia deposit rates will go
down to 7.4% per annum.
ICPS analysts expect the GDP share re'
distributed through the Consolidated
Budget will grow to 30% in 2005. The ICPS
forecast for the 2005 State Budget deficit
remains unchanged at 3% of GDP. This
deficit will be covered through
privatization revenues and international
borrowings. Over 2006–2007, the deficit
will shrink. ICPS economists do not expect
tax rates to go down during the forecast
period.
Given an upward adjustment in the forecast
for real wage growth, ICPS economists have
also upgraded their forecast for the growth
of real disposable household incomes for
2005 to 19.5%. Because of slower growth
of wages and a decline in social outlays in
real terms, real disposable household
incomes will slow down to 6% in 2006 and
6.5% in 2007.
In 2005, rapid growth of household
incomes and a high propensity to consume
will make private consumption grow 16% in
real terms. As a result of slower income
growth, private consumption will grow at a
more sluggish pace over 2006–2007.
During this period, private consumption is
expected to grow 8% per annum.
Forecast risks
The risks of the forecast are:
• a sharp decline in public trust in the
Administration because of the split in the
Yushchenko team;
• the failure of the government to develop
and implement reforms;
• shrinking tax revenues as a result of the
economic slowdown;
• steep fluctuations in the external
situation;
• further rises in the price for Russian gas
deliveries to Ukraine as of 2006;
• failure to accede to the WTO in 2005.
ICPS economists have been providing regular
forecasts for the economic development of
Ukraine since 1997. These forecasts are
updated quarterly and published in
quarterly predictions. If you are interested
in receiving this publication on a regular
basis, you can subscribe today by contacting
Andriy Starynskiy at (380/44) 484/4410 
or by e/mail at marketing@icps.kiev.ua. 
For more information about economic
forecasts, contact our senior economist,
Yevhenia Akhtyrko, at (380/44) 484 4403 or
by e/mail at eakhtyrko@icps.kiev.ua.
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Key macroeconomic indicators
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007
Indicators estimate f o r e c a s t   
GDP, billions UAH 344.8 412.1 486.5 542.6
Real GDP, apc 12.1 4.0 5.5 6.0
Real industrial output, apc 12.5 5.0 6.5 6.0
Real agricultural output, apc 19.9 3.0 1.0 3.0
Real gross fixed investment, apc 10.2 '2.0 7.0 9.0
Consumer price index, apc 12.1 13.1 7.6 7.8
Producer price index, apc 12.3 13.5 11.5 7.0
Average monthly real wages, apc 23.8 15.0 8.0 7.0
Unemployment rate (ILO methodology), % 8.6 8.2 8.0 7.8
Exports of goods&services, apc 37.2 13.0 7.0 8.0
Imports of goods&services, apc 26.0 20.0 13.0 15.0
Current account balance, % GDP 10.5 6.0 2.8 '0.3
Consolidated Budget balance, % GDP '3.2 '3.0 '2.0 '1.0
Official exchange rate 
(average annual), UAH/USD 5.32 5.11 5.04 5.09
apc = annual percentage change 
Sources: Derzhkomstat (State Statistics Committee), National Bank of Ukraine, 
Ministry of Finance; calculations and forecast by quarterly predictions
